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STATELESSNESS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MIGRATION 
CRISIS IN EUROPE: A GROWING CHALLENGE FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
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Abstract: Statelessness remains a secondary topic in the debate on 
the migration crisis that has been raging across Europe since 2015, 
but it will certainly come to the fore in the near future. This paper 
draws attention to the issue of limited social and scholarly interest 
in statelessness in the context of the present migration crisis. The re-
search explores how Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan nationality laws (as 
the majority of protection seekers come from these countries) regulate 
the issue of acquiring citizenship and why this gives rise to the prob-
lem of statelessness. The paper concludes that the lack of interest in 
the issue of statelessness is a growing challenge for the international 
community and requires systemic action. A ‘stateless generation’ may 
never become part of any society, which may in turn give rise to social 
confl icts in the countries of current residence. The author concludes by 
putting forward some suggestions for solving this problem from global, 
regional, state and civil society perspectives.
Keywords: statelessness, migration crisis, refugee crisis, asylum, in-
ternational law.
1 Introduction
The migration crisis − which started in 2015 and is still going on − 
caused by a massive infl ux of refugees and immigrants to Europe, main-
ly from the Middle East and Africa, has shown the weakness of existing 
legal regulations with regard to the status of refugees and migrants. It 
has also shown the frailty of the idea of supranational solidarity in the 
face of a problem of such magnitude as the recent infl ux of refugees from 
confl ict areas. The situation is further complicated by the fact that not 
all of the arrivals in Europe since 2015 are able to or want to prove their 
national origin.
The purpose of this article is to draw attention to the fact that the 
refugee crisis has created an entire ‘stateless generation’ of children 
growing up in limbo. This remains a problem unresolved by internati-
onal law and currently no signifi cant attempts to deal with this urgent 
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issue at the international arena are being made. It is not suffi ciently 
noted, both in practice and in literature, that this is a problem that is 
escalating and will have to be tackled in the near future. Statelessness 
as a phenomenon should be considered from three perspectives: from 
that of states, of stateless people, and of the host society. People without 
nationality are often relegated to the peripheries or margins of society, 
but they should not remain ignored in the international area. What adds 
to the gravity of the issue is that these people may never become part of 
any society, which may in turn give rise to social confl icts in the coun-
tries of current residence. 
Statelessness is therefore a challenge for the international commu-
nity and calls for systemic actions in which all sides involved participate: 
host countries, host societies, and stateless persons themselves. In an 
endeavour to fi nd possible solutions to the research problem of understu-
died and under-theorised statelessness in the context of the migration 
crisis, the following questions must be asked: what is statelessness and 
what are its causes? What values  and factors lead to an increase in sta-
telessness? What normative solutions have been taken at the universal 
and regional level to effectively counteract this phenomenon? What is the 
impact of the growing numbers of stateless persons on Europe? What 
are the consequences of statelessness for the international community, 
for EU citizens, for the communities of host countries, and, fi nally, for 
stateless persons themselves?
First, the concept of ‘stateless person’ will be defi ned, the reasons 
for the emergence of stateless people will be explored, and internatio-
nal legal acts addressing the problem of statelessness will be recalled. 
Attention will be given to the concept of ‘the right to have rights’ coined 
by Hannah Arendt. Referring to modern nation-states, the notable poli-
tical theorist distinguishes between the concept of the state and nation 
denoting a nationally defi ned community. Consequently, Arendt argues 
that human rights are essentially the rights of those considered mem-
bers of an organised political community, whereas stateless people are 
in fact rightless, denied ‘the right to have rights’ and to belong to a po-
litical community. This fact of not belonging to any political community 
results in constant discrimination and a lack of resources to oppose it. 
The paper will go on to present the current situation of non-nationals in 
Europe and will then consider the national laws governing the acquisi-
tion of citizenship in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan (as the countries from 
where the largest number of protection seekers originate). Finally, some 
suggestions will be made on to how to resolve the issue of statelessness 
in Europe and worldwide. 
Two basic research methods in the fi eld of legal sciences will be used 
in the article. The fi rst is the doctrinal research methodology, consisting 
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of an analysis of legal texts (an examination of applicable law). The area 
of doctrinal and legal analysis will involve national and international 
regulations related to the subject of the paper. The basic technique of the 
intended analysis will involve universally accepted methods of interpre-
tation of legal texts and legal inference rules. The second methodology to 
be used is that of comparative law research whose aim is to demonstrate 
the similarities and differences in the legal regulations in the fi eld of the 
discussed issues.
2 Defi ning statelessness
The defi nition of statelessness can be found in Article 1 of the 1954 
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (CRSSP): it is a 
state of not having any nationality − not being considered a national by 
any state under the operation of its law. Articles 1-10 CRSSP regulate the 
basic principles of treating and protecting stateless persons (including 
the national clause in the case of freedom of religious practice and the 
religious education of children), Articles 12-32 defi ne their legal status 
and individual rights (in terms of employment, social security, freedom 
of movement), while Articles 33-42 are the fi nal provisions. International 
statelessness regulations are supplemented by the 1961 Convention on 
the Reduction of Statelessness (CRS), which primarily adopts safeguards 
to prevent statelessness (Articles 1-10), sets out general rules for the pre-
vention and limitation of statelessness (Articles 11-13), followed by fi nal 
provisions (Articles 14-21). Both of these conventions constitute a basic 
international legal framework regarding statelessness and are aimed at 
preventing its incidence by providing standards on the acquisition and 
loss of nationality. Failure in the application of these conventions lies 
in the fact that they have been ratifi ed by few states (around several 
dozen countries), and therefore there is no uniform universal standard 
of treatment of stateless persons.1 The biggest controversy among states 
that have not ratifi ed the CRSSP and CRS is the fact that they grant 
citizen rights to stateless persons, whilst other foreigners acquire such 
rights only after years of tiresome procedures. The provisions relating to 
statelessness have been established in many international conventions, 
especially those under international human rights law.2
1 Only the rules of customary international law on child statelessness can be treated as 
part of a universal system. See William Thomas Worster, ‘The Presumption of Customary 
International Law: A Case Study of Child Statelessness’ (2017) available at <https://ssrn.
com/abstract=3091912> accessed 22 May 2020. See also Article 29 of the 2004 Arab Char-
ter on Human Rights and Article 7 of the 2005 Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam.
2 See the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (art 5); 
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (arts 13, 16 and 24); the 1979 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (art 9); the 
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In practice, the status of statelessness developed by the above-men-
tioned conventions has proven to be insuffi cient, which is why the lite-
rature3 divides de iure stateless persons − persons who formally do not 
have the citizenship of any country because they have lost or have never 
acquired it (in accordance with Article 1 CRSSP), and de facto stateless 
persons − persons who formally have national citizenship but cannot 
effectively exercise their rights (they are without legal residence, but 
cannot be deported or they lack access to some basic rights).4
As can be seen, the concept of statelessness is strictly defi ned in 
opposition to the concept of citizenship. Although it has not been defi ned 
expressis verbis in international documents, the general understanding 
of it, formulated in the case of the International Court of Justice in the 
Nottebohm case, has gained general acceptance:
According to the practice of States, to arbitral and judicial decisions 
and to the opinion of writers, nationality is a legal bond having as its 
basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, 
interest and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights 
and duties.5
The right to citizenship is ensured in Article 15 of the 1948 Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights (‘everyone has the right to a nationa-
lity’), as well as in regional acts of human rights protection.6 The inter-
national community recognises two main ways of acquiring citizenship: 
ius soli (law of the land − the acquisition of citizenship by the mere fact of 
being born on the territory of a given country) or ius sanguinis (law of the 
blood − inheritance of citizenship from parents). Statelessness occurs 
when a person falls between the cracks in the operation of these different 
laws, failing to obtain any nationality or losing his or her only nationa-
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (arts 7 and 8); the 1990 International Conven-
tion on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
(art 29); the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (art 18); the 1997 
European Convention on Nationality; the 2006 Council of Europe Convention on the Avoid-
ance of Statelessness in relation to State Succession.
3 See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidelines on Stateless-
ness  No   1:  The  Defi nition  of  ‘Stateless  Person’ in Article 1(1) of the 1954 Convention 
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 20 February 2012, HCR/GS/12/01.
4 See Katja Swider and Maarten Den Heijer, ‘Why Union Law Can and Should Protect State-
less Persons’ (2017) 19 European Journal of Migration and Law 108 and the literature cited 
there.
5 ICJ 1955/25 Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) [ICJ 1955].
6 This right is provided in regional human rights acts: the 1948 American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man (art 19); the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights (art 
20); the 1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (art 6); the 2004 Arab 
Charter on Human Rights (art 29); the 2005 Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam 
(art 7); the 2012 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (art 18).
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lity.7 Statelessness is caused especially through: a confl ict of nationality 
laws, state succession (also the rise and fall of states, the legacy of co-
lonisation), arbitrary deprivation of nationality (denationalisation), dis-
crimination (especially against woman in marriage law and through the 
paternal model of ius sanguinis), the inheritance of statelessness,8 and 
even the physical disappearance of state territory due to climate change 
(eg Tuvalu, Kiribati).9 There are also some administrative barriers to civil 
registration in the host country such as problems with documents, ie the 
lack of required documentation (including a birth certifi cate, marriage 
certifi cation) or the lack of a residence permit. 
It is necessary to emphasise that statelessness can appear in both 
migratory and non-migratory contexts. Two differences must be pointed 
out here. Firstly, there is a distinction between migrants and refugees 
who are considered to be stateless persons and those whose citizenship 
is not established. The latter are usually referred to as persons ‘without 
citizenship’ or ‘undefi ned citizens’,10 which does not automatically mean 
that they are stateless but derives on many occasions from the fact that 
they do not want to reveal their identity or citizenship. In such a case, 
the position of persons with undetermined citizenship − who do not want 
to offi cially disclose their citizenship − becomes similar to that of de fa-
cto stateless persons because, although they have a nationality, they do 
not effectively exercise the rights arising from it. Secondly, a distinction 
between migrants and refugees should be made clear, because persons 
coming to Europe from Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan during the migration 
crisis are often granted refugee status.11 The main difference between re-
fugees and migrants is that migrants are people who made their decision 
to migrate freely, without pressure from external circumstances beyond 
7 The Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, The Norwegian Refugee Council and The 
Netherlands Organisation for Scientifi c Research, ‘What Is Statelessness? Toolkit: Under-
standing Statelessness in the Syria Refugee’ available at <www.syrianationality.org/index.
php?id=14> accessed 22 May 2020.
8 Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, The World’s Stateless (Wolf Legal Publishers 
2014) 23-27.
9 See Jane Steffens, ‘Climate Change Refugees in the Time of Sinking Islands’ (2019) 52 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 727; Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Mi-
gration, and International Law (OUP 2012).
10 Estonian law in particular regulates this form of residence. It treats migrants from former 
Soviet republics and their children who, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, could not or 
did not want to apply for citizenship of any country as undefi ned citizens. For differences in 
national practices that are assessed in the light of the relevant international and EU stan-
dards, see Gerard-René De Groot, Katja Swider and Oliver Vonk, Practices and Approaches 
in EU Member States to Prevent and End Statelessness (European Parliament 2015). 
11 An individual can share protection under CRSSP as well as protection under the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (CRSR) (and this convention generally en-
sures more rights than the CRSSP). See UNHCR, Handbook on Protection of Stateless Per-
sons (UNHCR 2014) 31-32.
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their control (most often in order to improve their economic wellbeing), 
while refugees are sensu stricto understood as victims of persecution and 
sensu largo as victims of armed confl icts and other events that seriously 
disrupt public order.12 Refugees usually have preconditions for obtaining 
citizenship in a destination country that are different from those of re-
gular migrants, and these two groups can make use of different sources 
of legal protection.13 
Although the development of the international system for the prote-
ction of human rights is moving away from the principle that granting 
citizenship is the prerogative of states, not the right of the individual, 
stateless persons can be found in almost every country. They are expo-
sed to danger and forced to live in conditions of constant discrimination 
and inequality in comparison with the citizens of the country in which 
they are located − they often face numerous diffi culties, such as access 
to healthcare, to social assistance, the right to education or to legal em-
ployment, the right to acquire property, the right to marry and acquire a 
birth certifi cate for children. Their situation is also called ‘living in legal 
limbo’.14 
There is an obvious contradiction between the mechanism of prote-
cting human rights and ensuring equality resulting from human nature 
on the one hand, and the formalisation of national procedures for gran-
ting the right to citizenship on the other hand, discriminating the social 
position of persons without such citizenship. Hannah Arendt was among 
the fi rst philosophers to observe that the terms ‘citizen’ and ‘human’ do 
not mean the same. Timeless human rights appear to be without prote-
ction at a time when it becomes impossible to defi ne them as the rights 
of a citizen of a given country. Arendt, starting from the state paradigm 
12 The legal defi nition of a refugee (as a victim of persecution) is contained in Article 1 CRSR 
and all EU states are signatories to that convention. The extended defi nition is included 
especially in non-European acts of regional law and in the positions of international organi-
sations specialising in helping refugees, such as UNHCR or UNRWA. See Glossary on Migra-
tion (International Organization for Migration 2019); Adrian Edwards, UNHCR viewpoint: 
‘Refugee’ or ‘Migrant’ − Which Is Right? (UNHCR 2015) available at <https://www.unhcr.
org/55df0e556.htm> accessed 8 August 2020.
13 Practically every national law regulates the granting of citizenship to refugees and mi-
grants residing in the country in a different way, although some common standards of 
treatment for the two groups have been developed under the Common European Asylum 
System. See Sergio Carrera and Zvezda Vankova, Human Rights Aspects of Immigrant and 
Refugee Integration Policies (Council of Europe 2019); Inter-Parliamentary Union and UN-
HCR, Nationality and Statelessness. Handbook for Parliamentarians No 22 (Inter-Parliamen-
tary Union with the UNHCR 2010); Rainer Bauböck and others, Access to Citizenship and 
Its Impact on Immigrant Integration (European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies 2013)
14 See Michael Leach and Fethi Mansouri, Lives in Limbo: Voices of Refugees Under Tempo-
rary Protection (University of New South Wales Press 2004).
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(‘nation, territory and state’), defi ned the concept of ‘the right to have 
rights’, which indeed means the right to membership of a political com-
munity.15 People deprived of citizenship are not able to exercise the list 
of human rights because only members of society organised in a state 
have the means of practically exercising them.16 This concept remains 
relevant today. Stateless persons, despite the fact that they remain su-
bjects of natural rights (such as the right to life, the right to freedom, the 
right to property, etc), have a limited right to political participation in the 
country of residence, and thus limited protection of human rights. That 
is why it must not be forgotten that they should have the effective right 
to become citizens.
3 Statelessness in Europe in the context of the migration crisis 
The problem of statelessness became more important with the wi-
despread implementation of citizenship by states in the nineteenth cen-
tury. It diffused in Europe after World War I, and intensifi ed after World 
War II, as a result of a new division of borders and the creation of new 
states.17 Currently, the problem has been exacerbated by the infl ux of 
several million people since 2015, mainly from the Middle East and Afri-
ca, caused by armed confl icts and human rights violations as a result of 
civil and international wars during the so-called Arab Spring which took 
place nearly 10 years ago. The reason for the outbreak of these wars was 
the dissatisfaction of societies with living conditions, unemployment, ri-
sing food prices, longstanding authoritarian rule, the corruption and 
nepotism of the authorities, and widespread violation of human rights 
by regimes. As a result, civilians began to seek refuge en masse, fi rst 
in neighbouring countries, and then in countries that were not their 
fi rst countries of refuge − in wealthier Europe. From 2015 to 2017, over 
two-thirds of asylum seekers were taken in by Germany (almost 1.5 mi-
llion people), Italy (over 330,000 people) and France (over 250,000 peo-
15 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt Books 1994) 297.
16 See Alison Kesby, The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship, Humanity, and International Law 
(OUP 2012); Peg Birmingham, Hannah Arendt and Human Rights: The Predicament of Com-
mon Responsibility (Indiana University Press 2006); Giorgio Agamben, ‘We Refugees’ (1995) 
49(2) Symposium: A Quarterly Journal in Modern Literatures 114; Nanda Oudejans, ‘The 
Right to Have Rights as the Right to Asylum’ (2014) 43(1) Netherlands Journal of Legal 
Philosophy 7; David Owen, ‘On the Right to Have Nationality Rights: Statelessness, Citizen-
ship and Human Rights’ (2018) 65(3) Netherlands International Law Review 299; Andrew 
Schaap, ‘Enacting the Right to Have Rights: Jacques Rancière’s Critique of Hannah Arendt’ 
(2011) 10(1) European Journal of Political Theory 22.
17 See Paul Weis and Rudolf Graupner, The Problem of Statelessness (British Section of the 
World Jewish Congress 1944); Gerard Daniel Cohen, In War’s Wake: Europe’s Displaced 
Persons in the Postwar Order (OUP 2011).
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ple).18 Countries with the most benefi cial economic conditions seem to be 
the focus of these large-scale asylum fl ows. Over the last two years, the 
number of applications for international protection in EU countries has 
ranged from around 600,000 to 700,000 annually − more than a half 
fewer than at the beginning of the migration crisis. The lower number of 
people seeking refuge is mainly due to the fact that the wars have been 
continuing for several years and most of the victims have already left the 
territory of their own countries. In some countries, including Syria, Li-
bya, Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, the situation is still very unstable (often even 
worse than from 2010 to 2015) and does not seem likely to improve in the 
coming years. The large variety of migration routes, countries of origin 
and underlying motives for migration make the current migration crisis 
particularly diffi cult to address.19 Besides, a signifi cant number of unac-
companied minors (children without a responsible adult to care for them) 
have been coming as part of the migration crisis since 2015. These facts 
characterise the specifi c position of refugees who have come to Europe 
during the migration fl ows. Even though most of them intend to return 
to their home countries, the vast majority cannot imagine doing so in 
the near future.20 This is why they prefer to stay in centres for foreigners 
in Europe, where they hope someday to have relatively better conditions 
and future prospects than in their ruined homelands and neighbouring 
places. The vision of a future in Europe is even stronger than the thought 
of being on the margins of the host society as a result of statelessness.
It is diffi cult to fi nd statistics indicating the exact number of statele-
ss persons in Europe, but it is estimated that there are at least 600,000.21 
This is offi cial data, but if de facto stateless persons are added to them, 
as well as those who, due to differences in national procedures, were not 
qualifi ed as stateless persons, but whose origin is in fact not known,22 
Europe will have to face in the next several years over a million people 
on the margins of society. Legal steps should be taken to minimise the 
instance of statelessness and contribute to the social integration of sta-
18 Asylum statistics, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/
index.php?title=Asylum_statistics#Citizenship_of_fi rst-time_applicants:_largest_numbers_
from_Syria.2C_Afghanistan_and_Venezuela> accessed 8 August 2020.
19 OECD, ‘Is this Humanitarian Migration Crisis Different?’ (2015) 7 Migration Policy De-
bates 6.
20 Nasser Yassin, 101 Facts & Figures on the Syrian Refugee Crisis, vol 2 (Issam Fares In-
stitute for Public Policy and International Affairs American University of Beirut 2019) 126. 
For more on characterising asylum seekers arriving in the EU, see European Commission, 
‘An Economic Take on the Refugee Crisis. A Macroeconomic Assessment for the EU’ (2016) 
33 European Economy Institutional Paper 9. 
21 See European Network on Statelessness, available at <www.statelessness.eu> accessed 
23 May 2020.
22 Those persons are treated under specifi c regimes for ‘non-citizens’ or ‘undefi ned citizens’.
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teless persons, which will in turn bring economic, political and social 
benefi ts to both EU Member States and third countries. 
At present, statelessness in Europe can be characterised as follows: 
fi rstly, it has its source in the geopolitical situation resulting from the 
collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia − national laws regarding citizen-
ship in the newly created countries did not allow this nationality to be 
determined for some national groups such as the Roma or Tatars; se-
condly, not all countries have adopted international conventions on sta-
telessness, and therefore a confl ict of laws or gaps in nationality legisla-
tion continue to create statelessness at birth and later in life; thirdly, 
most stateless people in Europe were born in the region and are stateless 
in the only country they have ever known; fourthly, since citizenship 
can only be granted by offi cially recognised state authorities, there are 
still non-state territories in Europe from which persons without inter-
nationally recognised citizenship come − such as Palestinians or Kurds; 
fi fthly, since 2015, as a result of the infl ux of migrants and refugees to 
Europe, there has been a large group of people who were stateless before 
leaving their country of origin, or have since become stateless because 
of the national procedures of the country of origin, whose international 
situation remains unstable and who are unable or unwilling to return to 
their country of origin to obtain relevant documents.23
EU legislation does not deal effectively with the issue of statelessne-
ss which has emerged on such a massive scale. The only treaty provision 
regarding stateless persons is Article 67(2) of the Treaty on the Functio-
ning of the European Union,24 according to which stateless persons are 
treated as third-country nationals. There is also no uniform, harmoni-
sed legislation on nationality and citizenship at the EU level, which is 
mainly considered in the context of the common European asylum poli-
cy. There is no common directive establishing a mechanism for treating 
stateless persons, unlike a number of legal acts regarding refugees.25 
Even the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union26 does 
23 UNHCR, ‘Stateless in Europe: Ordinary People in Extraordinary Circumstances’ (2018) 8 
available at <www.refworld.org/docid/5aa79f9d4.html> accessed 23 May 2020.
24 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
[2012] OJ C326/47.
25 EU legislation that sets common criteria for the qualifi cation of people in need of inter-
national protection is included in Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualifi cation of third-country 
nationals or stateless persons as benefi ciaries of international protection, for a uniform sta-
tus for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the 
protection granted [2011] OJ L337 and Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing 
international protection [2013] OJ L180.
26 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391.
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not contain any statelessness-specifi c provision, so it can be concluded 
that at present the EU does not have an explicit entitlement to adopt legi-
slation or common measures on statelessness as a specifi c issue.27 Twen-
ty-four Member States are States Parties to the CRSSP and 19 Member 
States are States Parties to the CSP − so there is still a problem to achie-
ve uniformity within procedures determining the statelessness status, 
especially including specifi c administrative determination procedures 
for stateless persons. Most Member States still lack such procedures. 
What is more, national laws often do not provide a direct link between 
the determination of statelessness and the issuing of specifi c residence 
permits, which generates a huge problem for legal stay in the country of 
residence.28
4 Right to nationality in the nationality laws of Syria, Iraq and 
Afghanistan
To understand why statelessness is a growing problem for the Eu-
ropean and international community, it is important to understand the 
nationality laws of the countries of origin of the largest infl ux of migrants 
coming to Europe since 2015. Although most of these people can prove 
their identity, there is still an essential number of those for whom this 
is diffi cult. In the era of refugee crisis, the largest numbers of applicati-
ons for international protection in the EU have been made by citizens of 
Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq − a total of over a million people.29 As people 
of these nationalities represent the overwhelming majority of migrants, 
in the context of the right to citizenship, the examination of national law 
in this paper will focus exclusively on these three national legal systems.
The Syrian nationality law regulates the right to nationality throu-
gh the 1969 Legislative Decree 276.30 The situations where a person is 
treated as a Syrian ipso facto are given in Article 3 of this decree: fi rst of 
all, Syrian national law relies on paternal ius sanguinis (only a Syrian 
man has the right to automatically pass on his nationality to children); 
secondly, in the case of an unknown father (or both parents), Syrian citi-
zenship can be established only for those children who were born inside 
the country. The following articles deal with aspects of naturalisation 
27 Gabor Gyulai, ‘Statelessness in the EU Framework for International Protection’ (2012) 14 
European Journal of Migration and Law 284.
28 European Commission, ‘European Migration Network Inform − Statelessness in the EU’ 
(2016) 2-3 available at <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/fi les/00_in-
form_statelessness_fi nal_en.pdf> accessed 22 May 2020.
29 European Parliament, ‘Migration and Asylum’ available at <www.europarl.europa.eu/
thinktank/infographics/migration/public/index.html?page=intro> accessed 22 May 2020. 
30 Legislative Decree 276 − Nationality Law, 24 November 1969 (Syrian Nationality  Law) 
available  at  <www.refworld.org/docid/4d81e7b12.html> accessed 22 May 2020. 
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(Articles 4-7, linked to several conditions, such as having legal residence 
inside the country, knowing the Arabic language) and the acquisition of 
nationality through marriage (Articles 8-9). 
Following these rules, of those Syrians who change their host co-
untry during migration (not only those travelling to Europe, but everyw-
here else − a few millions of them went to Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and 
Egypt), every child born outside Syria who does not know his or her 
Syrian father or cannot prove that he or she was born of a Syrian father 
is automatically a stateless person. Even if the child’s mother knows that 
the father is Syrian, but he had stayed at home in Syria and is now lost 
or dead, she cannot pass Syrian citizenship on to her child.
Iraqi national law regulates the right to nationality in a different 
way. Pursuant to Article 3 of the 2006 Law 26 − Iraqi Nationality Law 
(INL),31 a person is considered Iraqi if (a) he or she was born to an Iraqi 
father or mother or (b) he or she was born in Iraq to unknown parents. 
Proving Iraqi identity becomes complicated when the child is born outsi-
de Iraq. Article 4 provides that the Minister of the Interior may consider 
an application from any person born outside Iraq to an Iraqi mother and 
an unknown or stateless father if he chooses Iraqi nationality, within 
one year from coming of age, unless he fails to do so due to diffi cult 
circumstances, provided that he is residing within Iraq at the time of 
application for Iraqi nationality. Therefore, in Iraqi national law, there is 
also discriminatory treatment of women in the administrative procedure 
(the act is silent on situations where a child is born outside Iraq to an 
Iraqi father and a mother with an unknown nationality − perhaps, in the 
light of Article 3, such a child acquires citizenship automatically?). Sub-
sequent articles of the INL determine conditions whereby nationality can 
be passed on through nationalisation, which also requires the taking of 
an oath to adhere to Islam (Article 8).
Finally, unlike the Syrian and Iraqi grounds for the acquisition and 
loss of citizenship, the Afghan nationality law is codifi ed mostly with in-
ternational standards, especially with human rights. The 2000 Law on 
Citizenship of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan32 provides that citizen-
ship is equal and similar for all citizens (Article 2). Traditionally, ius san-
guinis is the primary pathway to citizenship, besides naturalisation and 
the obligations imposed by international treaties in the case of confl ict of 
laws. However, the persistent, unstable political situation in the country 
since the 1980s has resulted in millions of Afghans fl eeing to other co-
31 Law 26 of 2006 − Iraqi Nationality Law, 7 March 2006 available at  <www.refworld.org/
docid/4b1e364c2.html> accessed 22 May 2020.
32 Law on Citizenship of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,  24 June 2000, available at 
<www.refworld.org/docid/404c988d4.html> accessed 22 May 2020.
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untries. Today, the number of citizens who lose their Afghan citizenship 
is higher than those who acquire Afghan citizenship,33 although Afghan 
law attempts to prevent statelessness and recognises even ius soli esta-
blished to prevent the emigration of its native citizens.
As mentioned above, Syrian and Iraq provide a national law which 
discriminates against women in passing on nationality to their children 
(as is the case under Lebanese and Jordanian law, too).34 In contrast, 
Afghan nationality law − although similar to  international standards 
of acquiring citizenship − faces the problem of its own citizens not wan-
ting to stay in Afghanistan and preferring to disclaim citizenship. Even 
though most Syrians, Iraqis and Afghans who emigrated to Europe after 
2015 can prove their identity, their children born in exile face the big 
risk of statelessness if their parents cannot fulfi l the conditions for na-
tionality of the country of origin or if the host country does not accord 
nationality to stateless children born there. Special attention should be 
given to them as long as the unstable situation in their home countries 
persists and fuels migration, thereby greatly increasing the numbers of 
stateless people.
It is hard to give the exact numbers of stateless persons as a result 
of the migration crisis, but some statistics show that in 2016 alone over 
142,000 Syrian children were born in exile. Over 90% of Syrian families 
cannot complete the birth registration of children born in Lebanon,35 so 
the situation cannot be very different in Europe. This gives rise to an 
enormous problem that will need to be faced in the near future.
5 Propositions to resolve the problems 
5.1 Global actions
First and foremost, there is no universal defi nition of statelessne-
ss accepted by all countries. This is the source of all the differences in 
the understanding of and in the approach to this problem. Therefore, 
a greater role should be played by the UN and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as initiators and coordinators of 
activities aimed at developing such a defi nition, primarily through rati-
fi cation of the CRSSP and CSP. Efforts should also be made to achieve 
33 Abdullah Athayi, Report on Citizenship Law: Afghanistan (European University Institute 
2017) 1 and 17 available at <https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/45933/
GLOBALCIT_CR_2017_09.pdf> accessed 22 March 2020.
34 See Decree No 15 on Lebanese Nationality including Amendments, 19 January 1925 and 
Law No 6 of 1954 on Nationality (last amended 1987) 1 January 1954.
35 Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, project ‘Addressing Statelessness in the Syr-
ia Crisis Context’ available at <www.nwo.nl/en/research-and-results/research-proj-
ects/i/49/26549.html> accessed on 22 May 2020.
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consensus on the acceptance of dual citizenship in national legal orders 
− without having to surrender or possess one of them.
Another task would be to conduct reliable statistical research in 
cooperation with the governments of all countries (as in the case of re-
fugees) to gain real knowledge of the scale of the problem, which today 
− with about 10 million stateless persons in the world − seems not to 
match reality, because countries with probably signifi cant numbers of 
stateless persons (such as India or China) do not provide offi cial statisti-
cs on this group of people.36 Only a reliable, trustworthy assessment of 
the scale of statelessness will allow legal regulations to be redefi ned at 
the international level, which will have a direct and indirect impact on 
the situation of stateless persons.
In addition, the procedural framework for de facto stateless persons 
should be harmonised. To protect them, if in their country of origin they 
fear that their security may be threatened (including the rule of non-re-
foulement in customary international law), then a uniform standard of 
treatment should be introduced, eg in the form of a residence permit (in 
accordance with the provisions of the CRSSP). Obtaining an appropriate 
status would be a prerequisite for being granted adequate legal protecti-
on. However, if there are no concerns about the threat to the security of 
de facto stateless person, then, on account of the citizenship possessed, 
it would be desirable to regulate legal return to the country of origin, be-
cause in this way the person would gain the protection of his or her own 
government and would cease to be treated as someone on the margins of 
the host society.
The latest activities of the international community aimed at redu-
cing statelessness include a campaign launched by UNHCR in 2014 to 
eradicate statelessness by 2024. It sets out a guiding framework made 
up of 10 Actions that need to be taken to end statelessness within 10 ye-
ars.37 The activities focus especially on preventing statelessness among 
children, preventing discrimination in nationality laws, and accession 
to the CRSSP and CSP. Although not all the Actions are required in all 
countries, probably at the moment of preparing the Action Plan, no mass 
migration amounting to millions was expected from Middle Eastern and 
African countries. The Global Action Plan to End Statelessness in 10 
years may prove impossible in the current situation; nonetheless, coun-
tries should strive to achieve as many of the planned targets as possible.
36 Lily Chen, Petra Nahmias and Sebastian Steinmueller, ‘Statistical Reporting on State-
lessness’ (2019) 1 UNHCR Statistics Technical Series 1.
37 UNHCR, Global Action Plan to End Statelessness: 2014-2024 available at <www.unhcr.
org/ibelong/global-action-plan-2014-2024/> accessed 23 May 2020. 
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5.2 Regional actions
Regional organisations should fi rst of all promote the acquisition 
of nationality as the primary solution. Having faster and more diverse 
direct measures (such as EU directives38) to infl uence Member States 
than the UN and its agencies, regional organisations should strive for 
harmonisation procedures to determine statelessness in as advanced a 
manner as was done in the refugee case. This should be done especially 
to ensure that no child is born stateless and all children are registered 
− which is ensured in all regional human rights law. The decisive factor 
in determining a child’s nationality should fi rst and foremost be the chi-
ld’s interest. All the more so in Europe, where most stateless persons 
were born in the region and are stateless in the only country they have 
ever known. To this end, adequate resources should be provided for lo-
cal administrative offi ces to enable the systematic registration of births, 
and consideration should be given to introducing uniform international 
adoption procedures.
Regional organisations should also establish close cooperation with 
UNHCR to exchange information and good practices on statelessness; 
they should regularly report on human rights issues concerning statele-
ss persons in the Member States.
5.3 State actions
Although statelessness touches upon international relations and in-
ternational law in general, it is typically cast as a problem to be solved 
by nationality law.39 Statelessness is an unfortunate consequence of the 
errors of public international law,40 but can be remedied under national 
citizenship law.
Firstly, state authorities should remember that the principle of equ-
ality and non-discrimination generally prohibits any discrimination ba-
sed on the lack of nationality status. It would be desirable to prohibit 
discrimination in the constitutions of all countries. There should be an 
38 There is an interesting concept for a statelessness directive in Swider and Den Heijer 
(n 4) 102: ‘The key elements of an EU directive on statelessness would consist of common 
criteria for i) a fair procedure for determining whether a person is stateless; ii) the standard 
of treatment to be accorded to stateless persons; and iii) the conditions of residence for 
stateless persons’.
39 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law (Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Sijthoff and Noordhoff 1979) quoted after Will Hanley, ‘Statelessness: An Invisible Theme in 
the History of International Law’ (2014) 25(1) European Journal of International Law 322.
40 Francesco Costamagna, ‘Statelessness in the Context of State Succession: An Appraisal 
under International Law’ in Serena Forlati and Alessandra Annoni (eds), The Changing Role 
of Nationality in International Law (Routledge 2013) 39, quoted after Hanley (n 39).
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equal model of giving nationality by ius sanguinis − not only the pater-
nal model (which is present in the national legal orders of countries of 
the Middle East). The abolition of discrimination in the law of granting 
citizenship will eliminate the vast majority of cases that Europe and the 
world face in times of migration crisis.
It should be remembered that even the application of the CRSSP and 
CSP do not replace or in any way affect the citizenship of an individual. 
Therefore, in order to eliminate the incidence of statelessness, states sho-
uld facilitate the path to naturalisation or repatriation. Naturalisation 
should be possible also for those who have actually lived in a country for 
several years and have set up their living centre there (they have started 
a family, have a permanent job), although they currently do not have an 
administrative residence permit due to their unknown origin − because 
they are integrated in society and could be a part of that society.
5.4 Civil society actions
All these global, regional and state actions should raise the level of 
understanding of statelessness among civil society, as well as promote 
and support actions preventing statelessness.41 Only local integration 
will facilitate naturalisation and the inclusion of stateless persons in the 
active life of society. It is the duty of NGOs in particular − since they are 
the closest to people − to provide real help to stateless persons, such as 
by monitoring government activity in the fi eld of legislation, offering free 
legal aid assistance, promoting awareness of human rights and Europe-
an law rights (even litigating cases before the European Court of Human 
Rights), carrying out educational (language, professional work) projects 
and psychotherapeutic programmes, fi ghting discrimination, as well as 
meeting basic needs − food or clothing. 
A good example here is the European Network on Statelessness, 
created in 2012, and committed to providing assistance to stateless per-
sons and their integration into society. This network is formed by NGOs, 
academic initiatives and individual experts from almost 40 countries.42 
They often focus their activities on refugees (providing social aid and 
legal advice) and work in more than one country. The most important of 
those who cooperate include the Churches’ Commission for Migrants in 
Europe (19 European countries),  Asylkoordination (Austria), NANSEN 
(Belgium), the Information Legal Centre (Croatia), the Danish Refugee 
41 Cf UN, Guidance Note of Secretary-General. The United Nations and Statelessness (2011).
42 More information on the structure and membership of the European Network on State-
lessness is available at <https://www.statelessness.eu/about-us/structure-and-member-
ship> accessed 7 October 2020.
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Council (Denmark), France terre d’asile (France), Informationsverbund 
Asyl und Migration (Germany), the Greek Council for Refugees (Gree-
ce), the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (Hungary), Consiglio Italiano per 
i Rifugiati (Italy), ASKV Refugee Support (Netherlands), the Norwegian 
Refugee Council (Norway), the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights 
(Poland), Accem (Spain), the Swedish Organization Against Statelessne-
ss (Sweden), Humanrights.ch (Switzerland), Refugee Rights Turkey (Tur-
key), and the Refugee Council (UK). Civil society organisations can be 
found in all European countries. Their commitment, also supported by 
reliable knowledge,43 helps to include people from the margins of society 
into active civic life.
6 Conclusion
Statelessness is a global issue, and also both a legal and a human 
problem that cries out for real solutions. The lack of ties in the form 
of nationality between the individual and the state poses a threat to 
human security, as well as to national and international security. The 
condition of ‘rightlessness’, the denial of human rights to which stateless 
persons are condemned, is a worldwide phenomenon which demands 
our attention. Despite the development of the international human ri-
ghts protection system after World War II, no solution has been found to 
eliminate the problem of the lack of the ‘right to have rights’ formulated 
by Hannah Arendt.
Statelessness remains a side issue in the debate on the migration 
crisis, which is a signum temporis of modern times, but this is a growing 
problem that must be tackled. In the near future, it will start to weigh 
more and more heavily on the European and international communi-
ty. The current migration crisis in Europe has some specifi c features: 
the origins of asylum seekers are more diverse than in previous waves, 
many come from farther away than neighbouring EU countries and the 
situation in their homelands during the last 10 years has been unstable, 
without signs of any quick positive solutions in the near future. As men-
tioned, there is a new stateless generation growing up in Europe consi-
sting of children of Syrians, Iraqis and Afghans who came as migrants 
or as refugees (and often even as children without an adult guardian 
or carer, which is why no one can prove their identity), and whose sta-
tus is so vulnerable due, most often, to the paternal ius sanguinis, the 
discrimination of women in nationality law, or internal confl ict. Not all 
43 Reliable information on statelessness and citizenship is provided, eg, by the Institute 
on Statelessness and Inclusion (see <www.institutesi.org> accessed 7 October 2020) and 
GLOBALCIT - an observatory within the Robert Schuman Centre of the European Universi-
ty Institute in Florence (see <globalcit.eu> accessed 7 October 2020).
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immigrants can prove their identity and they also cannot go back to the-
ir home countries to obtain the required identity documents. Children 
are at risk of becoming stateless in host countries if their parents cannot 
produce the required identity documents from the country of origin, or, 
simply, just because they were born in exile, and their parents’ country 
of origin denies citizenship rights to be passed on to them. They, in turn, 
will give birth to stateless children and the problem will only worsen. 
Therefore, one of the desirable solutions is to facilitate naturalisation, 
because inclusion in society and legalisation of stay will bring economic, 
political and social benefi ts to countries, societies and stateless persons 
themselves.
The concept of ‘world citizen identity’ might be too farfetched, but 
perhaps there is a chance, paradoxically, that due to the huge 2015 in-
fl ux of new migrants, the sense of European identity will become stron-
ger among the stateless generation. EU legislation already knows the 
concept of ‘EU citizenship’, which shapes EU integration, so perhaps in 
the future the motto ‘I am European’ will take on a new meaning.
Eradicating statelessness requires the coordination and coopera-
tion of international, regional, national and civil society actions. In the 
current situation − as consensus has already been developed internatio-
nally − the priority should be to grant citizenship to children who do not 
have documents and were born in the host country. This will contribute 
to their inclusion in society without making them prey to the destructive 
effects of statelessness. The principle of equality and non-discrimination 
which is the foundation of human rights, and the UN’s motto to promote 
peace, democracy and the rule of law, should not just be a conceptual 
declaration in the international human rights system, but, rather, an 
everyday reality experienced by stateless persons.
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